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S. Kuppuswami Sastri and the Exegetical Principles of eka-vākyatā and samanvaya: Their Influence on S.R. Ranganathan's Epistemology

Abstract: This article focuses on the influence that the Sanskrit scholar S. Kuppuswami Sastri (1880-1943) exercised on S.R. Ranganathan (1892-1970). More than anyone else, Sanskrit learning in South India stands in Kuppuswami Sastri's debt. No other Sanskritist combined traditional scholarship in both Śāstra ("scientific and philosophical treatises") and Kāvya ("literature") in such measure with modern scholarship, and no single Sanskritist contributed so largely to the cause of Sanskrit learning and education in 20th century South India. Special attention is given to the exegetical principles of eka-vākyatā ("syntactic unity") and samanvaya ("agreement", "consistency") in their respective philosophical contexts, i.e. Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. Following the Vedāntic tradition, Kuppuswami Sastri viewed the pivotal principle of eka-vākyatā as essentially a synonym of samanvaya, both of them being at the root of the accommodative processes that characterized Indian thought from its start. The thesis of this essay is that these principles along with other basic ideas of Indian philosophy played a major role in shaping Ranganathan's epistemology. Even Ranganathan's "discovery" of the five fundamental categories of personality, matter, energy, space and time (PMEST) was inspired by Indian concepts starting with the seminal principles (tattva) of puruṣa ("pure consciousness") and prakṛti ("materiality") of the Sāṃkhya dualist tradition. The article also points out the theme of preservation and classification of manuscripts and of the science of cataloguing. Kuppuswami Sastri and Ranganathan had convergent interests and were in an ongoing dialogue with one another: each of them was eager to share his profound knowledge and sophisticated methodological perspectives and in such mutual interplay the influence of Indian philosophy on Ranganathan was no doubt paramount.

Keywords: S. Kuppuswami Sastri, ekavākyatā, samanvaya, Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā

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S. Kuppuswami Sastri and the Exegetical Principles of *eka-vākyatā* and *samanvaya*: Their Influence on S.R. Ranganathan's Epistemology

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Abstract

This article focuses on the influence that the Sanskrit scholar S. Kuppuswami Sastri (1880-1943) exercised on S.R. Ranganathan (1892-1970). More than anyone else, Sanskrit learning in South India stands in Kuppuswami Sastri's debt. No other Sanskritist combined traditional scholarship in both Śāstra ("scientific and philosophical treatises") and Kāvya ("literature") in such measure with modern scholarship, and no single Sanskritist contributed so largely to the cause of Sanskrit learning and education in 20th century South India. Special attention is given to the exegetical principles of *eka-vākyatā* ("syntactic unity") and *samanvaya* ("agreement", "consistency") in their respective philosophical contexts, i.e. Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. Following the Vedāntic tradition, Kuppuswami Sastri viewed the pivotal principle of *eka-vākyatā* as essentially a synonym of *samanvaya*, both of them being at the root of the accommodative processes that characterized Indian thought from its start. The thesis of this essay is that these principles along with other basic ideas of Indian philosophy played a major role in shaping Ranganathan's epistemology. Even Ranganathan's "discovery" of the five fundamental categories of personality, matter, energy, space and time (PMEST) was inspired by Indian concepts starting with the seminal principles (*tattva*) of *puruṣa* ("pure consciousness") and *prakṛti* ("materiality") of the Sāṃkhya dualist tradition. The article also points out the theme of preservation and classification of manuscripts and of the science of cataloguing. Kuppuswami Sastri and Ranganathan had convergent interests and were in an ongoing dialogue with one another: each of them was eager to share his profound knowledge and sophisticated methodological perspectives and in such mutual interplay the influence of Indian philosophy on Ranganathan was no doubt paramount.

Next to the figure of the Scottish mathematician Edward Burns Ross (1881-1947)¹, whose influence on Shiyali Ramamrita Ranganathan (1892-1972) is

* I wish to thank my dear friend Fausto Freschi for his invaluable help in providing me with primary and secondary sources on S.R. Ranganathan.

¹ For a biographical sketch of Edward Burns Ross, see O'Connor & Robertson 2007.

well-known and repeatedly acknowledged by the latter², another major influence upon him that he widely recognizes in his writings is that of S. Kuppuswami Sastri (1880-1943) who for a few years was his colleague at Presidency College in Madras, today's Chennai³. Ranganathan regarded Kuppuswami Sastri as the most knowledgeable authority on India's religious and philosophical traditions, in particular non-dual (*advaita*) Vedānta which for him was not just a matter of academic interest but a way of life. The depth and breadth of India's spirituality that Kuppuswami Sastri incarnated had a decisive impact on Ranganathan's worldview and writings⁴. To be sure, the intellectual influence that an internationally acclaimed savant and Sanskrit erudite such as Kuppuswami Sastri had on Ranganathan is akin to that of a *guru* toward his *śiṣya* or pupil, and it comes as a matter of surprise that such relation has been substantially neglected by scholars. My paper is intended as a preliminary appreciation of Kuppuswami Sastri's influence on Ranganathan's epistemology⁵.

In an autobiographical passage in which Ranganathan points out the Vedic principle that guided his entire life and work, he writes (Ranganathan 1952: 13-14):

That [lasting] impression [produced by conversations with Edward B. Ross] had been given a name by another respected friend of mine Mahamahopadhyaya⁶ Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar. That name is *ekavakyata* (= unity). He used to say that all knowledge was one. The Vedas form, in a sense, a single sentence. So does every chapter of it form a single sentence; and, of course, every sentence in it is a single sentence.

When Providence transferred my field of interest from Mathematics to Library Science, this *ekavakyata* tradition of the Vedic ancestors, demonstrated in daily life by my Professor, came with me. When I spent a year wandering amidst diverse libraries in Great Britain in 1924-25 to prepare myself for my new life, the light of this *eka-*

² Ross taught him Mathematics at the Madras Christian College for six years. He captured Ranganathan's mind from the very beginning, i.e. from 18 March 1909 up until his retirement on 14 April 1932.

³ Ranganathan joined the Presidency College as Assistant Professor of Mathematics in 1921. In 1924, he left Presidency College to take appointment as the first librarian of Madras University.

⁴ In his works Ranganathan often quotes from the epics of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata*, from the *Purāṇas* and from illustrious *kāvya* authors such as Daṇḍin (7th-8th century); see Kundu & Biswas 2011: 167-182.

⁵ For an appreciation of Ranganathan's figure, understood as a synthesis of Indian culture and modern science, useful is the biography written by his only son Yogeshwar; see Ranganathan 2001. See also Kumar 1992 and Kent 1978.

⁶ Lit. "great excellent teacher". An honorific title awarded to most prestigious scholars by the British Raj and, after 1947, by the Government of India. The title of *mahā-mahopādhyāya* was conferred on Kuppuswami Sastri in 1927.

vakyata principle was disclosing the minutest imaginable details in library practice. It illuminated each of them, and at the same time threw them into a coherent whole. I felt the *ekavakyata* pervading all that I saw in the British library world and all that I read in the splendid library on Library Science found in the School of Librarianship of the University College, London. I still find it guiding me in all my thought and life. I often realize that even apparently trivial occurrences are organically fused into a single life-experience. Occasionally when immersed in thinking out ideas, all the long years of life fuse into a single moment. Such is the potency of *ekavakyata*. [...] That book [= *The Five Laws of Library Science*] is a verbal record of the *ekavakyata* of library practice and science, as it revealed itself to me⁷.

Before immersing ourselves in this unitary conception of knowledge or *eka-vākyatā*, a brief presentation of S. Kuppuswami Sastri is in order. More than anyone else, Sanskrit learning in South India stands in his debt. It is fair to say that no other Sanskritist combined traditional scholarship in both Śāstra (“scientific and philosophical treatises”) and Kāvya (“literature”) in such measure with modern scholarship, and no single Sanskritist contributed so largely to the cause of Sanskrit learning and education in 20th century South India.

1. On Kuppuswami Sastri’s Life and Works

S. Kuppuswami Sastri was born in the State of Tamil Nadu, in the village of Gaṇapati Agrahāra on the banks of the River Kāverī in the Tanjore district, on December 15, 1880. Raised in a family of traditional Brahmin scholars, he received a thorough education in Sanskrit language and literature while also attending an English-medium school. Already before reaching his III form at the English school, he had become a master of Sanskrit to the point that his family decided that he should study the Śāstras directly in Sanskrit, giving to English education only a secondary place.

His chief teacher in Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Nyāya is said to have been the famous renunciant (*saṃnyāsin*) Śrī Brahendra Sarasvatī, popularly known as Palamāneri Svāmigal⁸. He later studied Vyākaraṇa or Sanskrit grammar under Nīlakaṇṭha Śāstrigal of Thiruvaiyaru and more Nyāya under Candrasekhara Śāstrigal. Even before he was twenty years old, he had mastered Sanskrit gram-

⁷ For an overview on the significance of Indian culture in Ranganathan’s *Five Laws of Library Science*, see Toti 2011: 39-52.

⁸ V. Raghavan writes that Śrī Brahendra Sarasvatī “was a pupil of Rāma Śāstrigal and Sundara Śāstrigal, the pupils of the famous Mahāmahopādhyāya Tyāgarāja alias Rāja Śāstrigal of Mannārguḍi, author of *Nyāyendraśekhara* and other works” (1944: 18).

mar and literature and had a thorough knowledge of the six schools of Indian philosophy⁹.

Meanwhile, he also studied law at the Universities of Madras and Trivandrum. Before qualifying as a lawyer, however, in 1906 he was appointed Principal of the Madras Sanskrit College at Mylapore by V. Krishnaswami Iyer (1863-1911), its founder, who was struck by the mastery and thoroughness with which he could handle the most complex Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta texts. Kuppuswami Sastri maintained this position for four years, until 1910, after which he became Principal of the Raja's College of Sanskrit and Tamil Studies at Thiruvaiyaru for four more years, from 1910 to 1914. Finally, from 1914 up until his retirement in 1936 he was appointed Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at the prestigious Presidency College in Madras¹⁰.

Kuppuswami Sastri was not only an eminent scholar but also a great teacher who loved his pupils and gave out his best to them, spending many additional hours clarifying their doubts and helping them in understanding intricate questions of grammar and philosophy. He also helped the more advanced among his research students in the editing of Sanskrit texts and the reconstruction of broken manuscript lines. As a matter of fact, many of those who had the good fortune of having him as their teacher became first-rate scholars in the field of Indian studies. Moreover, he took a leading role in Indological activities all across the sub-continent, presiding over the All-India Oriental Conferences and the All-India Sanskrit Conferences, the Indian Philosophical Congress, the Kancipuram Pariṣat, the Advaita Sabhā of South India, and many other cultural associations. Besides his dedicated class teaching, he also delivered many lectures on the six *darśanas* of Indian philosophy as well as on epistemology and literary criticism, which represented one of the formative forces in the building up of his school of South Indian research.

As the Curator of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Kuppuswami Sastri published nearly sixty-six volumes of Descriptive and Triennial Catalogues. Moreover, under his chief editorship, the Madras University undertook the preparation of the monumental *New Catalogus Catalogorum of Manuscripts* starting in 1933. Among his publications, mention must be made of a primer of Indian logic based on the Nyāya synthesis of Annambhaṭṭa (c. 1650), and of the editions of the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana (9th century) – with Abhinavagupta's (c. 960-1010) commentary and his own *Upalocana* commentary – and

⁹ For an introduction to the philosophical systems of classical Indian thought, see Torella 2008a and Potter 1991.

¹⁰ For a short history of Presidency College, the first academic institution established by the British India Government in 1840, see *Presidency College, Chennai* (2020).

of the *Brahma-siddhi* and the *Vibhrama-viveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra (7th-8th century). He published editions of many other Sanskrit texts in the *Journal of Oriental Research* and in the *Madras Oriental Series*, both of which were founded by him. After five years of honorary Professorship at Annamalai University (1936-1940), he retired to his native village where he passed away on September 5, 1943, at the age of 64. The *Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute* (KSRI) in Chennai, a Center for Sanskrit and Indology with a library that comprises nearly 60,000 books and 1,500 palmleaf manuscripts, was established in 1945 as a tribute to him and his extraordinary contributions to Indian culture¹¹.

2. The Concepts of *eka-vākyatā* and *samanvaya*

In what happened to be Kuppuswami Sastri's last series of lectures, delivered on 16-17 February, 1940 as the Rao Bahadur K. Krishnaswami Rao Endowment Lectures under the auspices of the Madras University – later to be published in 1946 with the title *Compromises in the History of Advaitic Thought* thanks to the efforts of M. Hiriyanna, K.A. Nilakantha Sastri, T.R. Chintamani and V. Raghavan – he deals with the concept of *eka-vākyatā* along with that of *samanvaya*. By referring to the originators of Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā, i.e. Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini, he points out the crucial significance of both these exegetical principles that lie at the root of Indian thought. We read (Kuppuswami Sastri 1946: 16-17):

Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini are the earliest systematic and authoritative exponents of the principles of exegesis, as applicable to the *Jñāna-kāṇḍa* [= knowledge section] and the *Karma-kāṇḍa* [= rites section] of the *Veda*... They provided Indian exegesis with highly elastic principles of interpretation which were all developed round the pivotal principle of thought-unity or sentence-unity – the *samanvaya* of the *Brahma-sūtras* and the *eka-vākyatā* of the *Karma-mīmāṃsā-sūtras*; and they were perhaps satisfied that the accommodative processes resulting from a wide use of the principles of *samanvaya* and *eka-vākyatā* by competent thinkers would eventually lead to the establishment of the Advaita doctrine, together with all the admissible ways of compromise. Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini themselves would appear to have exercised a wide reticence in respect of their own philosophical convictions. Perhaps they believed that philosophical thinking and the quest for truth would gain immensely by their *Sūtras* being so composed as to admit of use by several *bhāṣya-kāras* [= commentators] in support of Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita.

¹¹ For biographical sketches of S. Kuppuswami Sastri, see Gode 1943: 279-281; Raghavan 1944; Sweetman 2008: 440; Kuppuswami Sastri (2015). On the *Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute* and S. Kuppuswami Sastri, see *Kuppuswami Sastri* (n.d.).

Kuppuswami Sastri links these exegetical principles of thought-unity and sentence-unity to a “spirit of compromise” which he envisions as “perhaps the dominating feature of all types of religious and philosophical thinking in the Ṛgvedic age” (Kuppuswami Sastri 1946: 5). He is keen to underline how this accommodative spirit was a characteristic of Indian thought since its inception (Kuppuswami Sastri 1946: 5-6):

[T]he *Ṛgveda-saṃhitā* strikes a highly significant note in the concluding hymn, in the verse, “*Samṅacchadhvam, saṃvadadhvam, saṃ vo manāṃsi jānatām*”, “Meet together, talk together (in an accommodative spirit, so as to give and take, to live and let live) and may your mind apprehend (the truth) alike”¹². It is noteworthy that the central concept of *saṃvāda* in this verse, as opposed to *vivāda*, comprises the spirit of compromise, as one of its essential components, and perhaps, in this way, by encouraging an ever-increasing stress on *saṃvāda*, *saṃpratipatti*, *paraspara-bhāvanā* – mutual adjustment, mutual regard and mutual concession, in the sphere of thinking, speaking and doing (*manas*, *vāk*, *kāya*): thus, perhaps, it is that, all through the ages, the cultural life of India has been growing, with its distinctive features of *absorption*, *tolerance*, *synthesis* and *accommodation*. We may be forcefully reminded at this stage of what Manu – one of our oldest lawgivers – has said about the accommodation of *satya* with *priya* – of what is *true* with what is *agreeable*, *beautiful* and *good* (*satyaṃ brūyāt priyaṃ brūyāna brūyāt satyamapriyam | priyaṃ ca nānṛtaṃ brūyādeṣa dharmaḥ sanātanaḥ* || *Manu-smṛti* IV, 138)¹³.

Kuppuswami Sastri’s remarks are consistent with what was the dominant religious ideology of his times, i.e. the inclusivistic, tolerant *weltanschauung* of Vivekānanda’s (1863-1902) Neo-Hinduism¹⁴, and it is indeed in this atmosphere that Ranganathan formed his own convictions. At the same time, there is no question that Kuppuswami’s praise of the “spirit of compromise” reflects a deep persuasion of his based upon his knowledge of the Sanskrit sources and of the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta philosophical traditions¹⁵. In these lectures he makes it a point to show how such accommodative tendency lies at the very core of India’s culture throughout its history, from the earliest Ṛgvedic times up to his

¹² See *Rg-veda* 10.191.2.

¹³ Here is an English translation of *Manu-smṛti* 4.138: “He should say what is true, and he should say what is pleasant; he should not say what is true but unpleasant, and he should not say what is pleasant but untrue – that is the eternal law” (Olivelle 2005: 131).

¹⁴ On Vivekānanda’s Neo-Hinduism, see Halbfass 1990: 228-246, 249-254. See also Rigopoulos 2019b: 438-460.

¹⁵ Umesha Mishra writes that S. Kuppuswami Sastri “is a nucleus for the study of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in the South. He has taught and produced several scholars in Mīmāṃsā [...]. He has written several papers on the system, mostly on the Prabhākara School [...]. Besides, his big Introduction to his edition of the *Brahmasiddhi* by Maṇḍana Mishra throws much light on his views about certain historical aspects of Mīmāṃsā” (Jha 1942: 71-72).

contemporary Swami Brahmānanda Sarasvatī (1871-1953), the authoritative Śāṅkarācārya of the Jyotir Math monastery in North India. As the Neo-Hindu philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975) writes in his Foreword: “The book illustrates with a wealth of learning and critical penetration, the central characteristic of the Hindu mind, the spirit of comprehension as distinct from that of exclusion. It is this feature which has enabled the Hindu mind in the past to welcome new ideas and integrate them to the master plan of Hindu thought. When the spirit declined, our cultural progress got arrested. The revival of the spirit today will help us to take up and answer the challenge of modern times” (Kuppaswami Sastri 1946: i)¹⁶.

Let us now turn to the concept of *eka-vākyatā* as it originally developed within Mīmāṃsā philosophy. In Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* 2.1.46, we find the following definition which was originally meant to explain Vedic sentences taken from the *Yajur Veda*: “A group of words serving a single purpose (*arthaikatva*) forms a sentence, if on analysis the separate words are found to have mutual expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*)”¹⁷. In time, the notion of *arthaikatva* or unity of meaning was extended to ordinary sentences and is directly related to the Mīmāṃsā principle of *eka-vākyatā* or “syntactic unity”, which establishes that if a group of words can be interpreted as a single sentence/statement it is not proper to split it and interpret it as two or more sentences/statements: given its syntactic unity, the sentence/statement will convey a single, coherent meaning, whether literal or metaphorical¹⁸. As per the Mīmāṃsā definition, the notion of *ākāṅkṣā* or mutual expectancy highlights that the words of a sentence must be interdependent with one another in order to give a unified meaning, i.e. one word needs the other in order to complete the sense, as it also happens in the case of grammatical compounds (*samāsa*). On the other hand, an utterance thought to convey multiple, overlapping meanings is said to be guilty of the flaw of *vākya-bheda* or the “splitting of the sentence”.

Significantly, in *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.1.1 the grammarian Pāṇini (c. 4th century BCE) utilizes the term *sāmarthyā* (lit. “capacity”) as the inherent condition for forming compounds, given that this technical term implies semantic connection by syntactic elements, i.e. the capacity of words for mutual association. Along these

¹⁶ On Hinduism vis-à-vis modernity, see Smith 2003.

¹⁷ *arthaikatvād ekam vākyaṃ sākāṅkṣaṃ ced vibhāge syāt*. The translation is of Harold G. Coward; see Coward & Kunjuni Raja 1990: 83. On *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* 2.1.46, see Jha 1942: 189-191 and Fujii 2014: 299-312. On the notion of expectation or *ākāṅkṣā*, see Kunjuni Raja 1977.

¹⁸ Harold G. Coward observes: “A sentence like *paśya mrgo dhāvati*, ‘see the deer is running,’ would be a single sentence according to this principle (not treating it as two: ‘the deer is running’ and ‘see him’)” (Coward & Kunjuni Raja 1990: 84). On syntactic unity, see Joshi 1968: 165-173.

lines, in his *Vārttika* commentary to Pāṇini's *magnum opus* the grammarian Kātyāyana (c. 250 BCE) offers two allied explanations of the term *sāmarthya*: a) *ekārthībhāva*, which means that words that are compounded together make a "grammatical unity" given their single integrated meaning: they can no longer be treated separately since they form an indivisible whole (which is equivalent to the *arthaikatva* notion in the definition of *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* 2.1.46); and b) *vyāpekṣā*, which means "mutual relations", in the sense that the words in a compound are combined or "thrown together" (*samasyante*) in ways that maintain their mutual relations, i.e. their interdependence (which is equivalent to the *ākāṅkṣā* notion in the definition of *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* 2.1.46).

In all cases, the Mīmāṃsā principle of *eka-vākyatā* or "syntactic unity" implies that in a sentence there must be *both arthaikatva* or unity of meaning – the sentence being an integral unit – and *ākāṅkṣā* or mutual expectancy/interdependence between the words that make it up – the constituent parts of a sentence being inseparable from one another. In the course of time, the Prabhākara and Bhāṭṭa schools of Mīmāṃsā were particularly keen in investigating *ākāṅkṣā* as psychological expectancy, whereas the grammarians and the Nyāya logicians restricted themselves to syntactic expectancy. Thus later Naiyāyikas defined *ākāṅkṣā* as a kind of syntactic need that one word has for another in a given sentence in order to convey the interrelation of words¹⁹. Two more conditions that Mīmāṃsakas added as factors of sentence unity were *yogyatā* or consistency of meaning and *āsatti/saṃnidhi* or contiguity of words, to which some also added the knowledge of *tātparya*, i.e. the intention of the speaker²⁰.

In Vedānta, which essentially follows the Mīmāṃsā tenets, *eka-vākyatā* is said to be of two types: *pada-eka-vākyatā*, i.e. when a whole statement can be boiled down to a single concept/word, and *vākya-eka-vākyatā*, i.e. when two statements come in sync with one another and reciprocally reinforce one another. More generally, *eka-vākyatā* is understood as the principle of consistency of the main thesis of any given text throughout the entire work and this is the most crucial point that needs to be pointed out in any exegetical enterprise. For instance, Śaṅkara's (c. 700 CE, trad. 788-820) commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtras* as well as on the *Upaniṣads* and the *Bhagavad-gītā* are typically preceded by a preamble in which he states his main thesis and prepares the reader for what follows in the subsequent sections. It is useful to come back to these initial introductory portions of Śaṅkara precisely in order to grasp his key argument and make sense of the more intricate points that are later raised within his commentaries.

¹⁹ On these developments, see Coward & Kunjuni Raja 1990: 84-86.

²⁰ On these issues, see Coward & Kunjuni Raja 1990: 86-90.

In particular, six indicators or *ṣaḍ-liṅgas* of the central teaching (*tātparyā*) of any given text are recognized, as reported in the following verse which no doubt Kuppuswami Sastri knew well: *upakramopasaṃhārāv abhyāso 'pūrvatā phalam | arthavādopapattī ca liṅgaṃ tātparyā-nirṇaye ||*. It is the Advaita Vedāntin teacher Mādhava (14th century) in his *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* or “Compendium of All Philosophical Schools”, notably in the chapter on the *Pūrṇaprajña-darśana*, an earlier system of absolutist Mīmāṃsā, that cites this verse and its six criteria for determining textual intentionality, giving as its source the *Bṛhat-saṃhitā* or “Great Compendium” of the astronomer Varāhamihira (mid 6th century)²¹. These *liṅgas* are understood as the logical indicators of the *tātparyā* of any statement. Although the six *liṅgas* may not all be evident in a given text, nonetheless if the *tātparyā* is to be established at least some of these *liṅgas* must be operative and discernible. The *ṣaḍ-liṅgas* are used in both Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta – Vedānta having basically appropriated Mīmāṃsā hermeneutical techniques – in order to establish the central teaching of Vedic texts, though many of them are also used intuitively by any person trying to establish the *tātparyā* of any statement. Thus some of the *liṅgas* are utilized when reading an essay or even in simple conversation. The six *liṅgas* are traditionally explained by using as example the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (6th century BCE). Herein, the *tātparyā* of the *Upaniṣad* is that the *ātman* or individual self is identical with *Brahman* or the Absolute.

The first *liṅga* is known as *upakrama upasaṃhāra* (lit. “introduction and conclusion”) and is the most important of the six *liṅgas*. It indicates the unity of thought in the beginning and in the end that must characterize any given work. Significantly, it is also known as *upakrama-upasaṃhāra-eka-vākyatā* or simply as *eka-vākyatā*. Just as any good essay states its *tātparyā* clearly in both its introduction and conclusion, the statements at the beginning and end of an Upaniṣadic section must be in agreement with one another and illustrate its central teaching. Thus the teaching of Uddālaka Āruṇi to his son Śvetaketu in the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* begins with the words *sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam*, i.e. “In the beginning, son, this world was simply what is existent – one only, without a second” (6.2.1), and ends with the words, *aitadātmnyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyaṃ sa ātmā* (6.16.3), i.e. “that constitutes the self of this whole world; that is the truth; that is the self (*ātman*)” (Olivelle 1996: 149, 156)²². This indicates that the *tātparyā* of this chapter is that everything, including oneself, is the pure self or *ātman*²³.

²¹ See Cowell & Gough 1882: 101.

²² All translations of Upaniṣadic passages are of Patrick Olivelle.

²³ To give another example, the *tātparyā* of the *Bhagavad-gītā* is said to be *mokṣa* by means of *śoka-nivṛtti*, i.e. the “cessation of sorrow”, since its teaching begins with the words *aśocyān*

The second *liṅga* is *abhyāsa* or repetition. Even in informal conversation, the *tātparya* of the speaker is indicated by its repetition. Thus if a child wants to convey that he/she wants something in particular, he/she will repeat it several times until he/she gets it. Likewise, the repetition of a statement is an indication of its *tātparya*. In the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, the *mahā-vākya* (lit. “great saying”) *tat tvam asi*, traditionally translated as “That art thou”²⁴, is repeated nine times and this is understood to be the proof that its unifying theme is the identity between the individual self and the ultimate being (*sat*).

The third *liṅga* is *apūrvatā* or originality, lit. “the not having existed before”. Indeed, a statement is often put forward in order to convey something new and original, something which was not known before the statement was uttered. This is especially the case with statements contained in the *Vedas*, which are believed to be “non human” (*apauruṣeya*) and a revelation from the Absolute (*śruti*, the “heard” [texts], revealed to inspired seers, the *ṛṣis*). Thus the *tātparya* of any Upaniṣadic statement must be something novel, unheard of before. A good example of what cannot be known by any other means but the revelation of the *Upaniṣads* is precisely the identity between the *ātman* or self, i.e. the ultimate essence of a human being, and *Brahman* or the ultimate essence of the cosmos. In the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* this *apūrvatā* is conveyed in statements such as *śraddhatsva somyeti*, i.e. “Have faith [in what I say], my son” (6.12.2) and *ācāryavān puruṣo veda*, i.e. “When a man has a teacher, he knows” (6.14.2).

The fourth *liṅga* is *phala* or the result/consequence. Since the *Vedas* are believed to be a means for achieving various desirable ends, the *tātparya* must necessarily entail some desirable consequences, its fruitfulness. The *phala* or result of experiencing the identity of *ātman* and *Brahman* is known as *mokṣa*, the final liberation from the painful round of births and deaths (*saṃsāra*), which is the highest aim of human life. In the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, this glorious achievement is hinted at in the statement *tasya tāvad eva ciraṃ yāvad na vimokṣye | atha sampatsye ||*, i.e. “There is a delay for me here only until I am freed; but then I will arrive!” (6.14.2).

The fifth *liṅga* is *artha-vāda*, the explanation of the meaning, which amounts to praise. Such praise can be in the form of eulogy (*stuti*) and, by contrast, of

anvaśocas tvam, “thou hast mourned those who should not be mourned” (2.11) and ends with the words *mā śucaḥ*, “be not grieved!” (18.66); see Edgerton 1944: 10, 90. It is also argued that the *tātparya* of the *Bhagavad-gītā* is *dharma*, i.e. duty or righteousness, given that it begins with the word *dharma* (*dharma-kṣetre*; 1.1) and its first syllable is *dhar-* and its last syllable is *-ma* (*mama*; 18.78).

²⁴ In an insightful study of 1986, Joel Brereton has proposed to translate this famous *mahā-vākya* differently, as meaning “in that way are you” (Brereton 1986: 98-109). The intended meaning would be to show that Śvetaketu lives in the same manner as all other creatures, i.e. by means of an invisible and subtle essence.

censure (*nindā*) of what is contrary to the contents of any given statement. The idea is that the *tātparya* of the text should be praised and its opposite criticized. An example of *artha-vāda* within an *Upaniṣad* is any statement that discusses the emission/production (*sṛṣṭi*) of the world. Since the understanding of *sṛṣṭi* achieves no end in and of itself, statements about *sṛṣṭi* are to be understood as *artha-vāda*. Thus statements about *sṛṣṭi* promote oneness by presenting it as the truth and by criticizing plurality, its opposite, as untruth (*mithyā*). An example of *artha-vāda* in the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* is *tad aikṣata bahu syām prajāyeya iti tat tejo 'srjata*, i.e. “And it thought to himself: ‘Let me become many. Let me propagate myself.’ It emitted heat” (6.2.3).

The sixth and final *līṅga* is *upapatti* or the ascertained conclusion. The *tātparya* of a statement is corroborated by giving evidence of that *tātparya*. For example, if a child wants to convey that he/she wants something, he/she will offer various proofs to justify his/her request, i.e. why he/she needs it. In the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, several examples are given to demonstrate how all products are identical with their cause, such as a pot and the clay of what it is made from. We read: *yathā soṃyaikena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛnmayaṃ vijñātaṃ syādvācā 'rambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam*, i.e. “It is like this, son. By means of just one lump of clay one would perceive everything made of clay – the transformation is a verbal handle, a name – while the reality is just this: ‘It’s clay’” (6.1.4). Here the *tātparya* or central teaching is the identity of the entire universe (*jagat*), of its countless names and forms, with its original cause (*sat*).

It is important to note that the concept of *eka-vākyatā* is not restricted to the domain of language but is also applied to other contexts in which various elements are said to be dependent upon each other, i.e. to be in a mutual relation being united under the same purpose. Thus *eka-vākyatā* is also used to refer to mutual agreement in a more general sense. For example, in the case of the relation between direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and scripture (*śabda, āgama*), which are recognized as two means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), there is no issue of “language” or “sentence” and yet the Advaita Vedāntin philosopher Maṇḍana Miśra calls it *eka-vākyatā* given the cooperative interaction existing between *pratyakṣa* and *śabda*²⁵.

Following the Vedāntic tradition, Kuppuswami Sastri views the pivotal principle of *eka-vākyatā* as essentially a synonym of *samanvaya*, both principles being at the root of the accommodative processes that characterized Indian thought from its start. The noun *samanvaya* is derived from verbal root \sqrt{v} with prefixes *sam-* and *anv-*, literally meaning “to go together after”, “follow”, “to

²⁵ On the usage of *eka-vākyatā*, see David 2020: 387-388, nn. 359-360.

infer or ensue as a consequence". It thus comes to mean "regular succession/order", "connected sequence", "consequence", "conjunction", "mutual or immediate connection". Significantly, the first of the four chapters (*adhyāya*) of the foundational text of Vedānta, i.e. the *Brahma-sūtras* attributed to Bādarāyaṇa and redacted in the early centuries CE, is titled *samanvaya* which can be translated as "agreement" or "consistency" since it is meant to distill, synchronize and bring into a harmonious whole the seemingly diverse and conflicting passages of the Vedic revelation. The term *samanvaya* is employed at the very beginning of the text, i.e. at *Brahma-sūtra* 1.1.4, in order to counter the objection that *Brahman* is not an object of knowledge in the *śruti*, given that the *Vedas* prescribe ritual actions as their goal while the *Upaniṣads* do not have such goal and thus must be considered meaningless/useless. The *sūtra* is meant to demonstrate that *Brahman* is the veritable subject of all revealed texts. Indeed, it wants to prove that *Brahman* is known only through the *śruti* since ultimately all the words in the *śruti* refer to *Brahman*. We read: "*tat tu samanvayāt*, i.e. 'But that (is so, that is, *Brahman* is known from scripture), because (the passages in question) are connected (to *Brahman*) through (their) meaning'" (Potter 1998: 124). The strenuous effort of the author of the *Brahma-sūtras* and subsequently of all its commentators (*bhāṣya-kāras*) is to show the congruence of the *śruti* passages on *Brahman*, their concordance and mutual connection which is aimed at establishing one and the same meaning, shunning the objections of all opponents. An authoritative example is the *incipit* of Śaṅkara's commentary to this *sūtra* as taken from his *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* (Gambhirananda 1956: 21-22):

The word *tu* (but) is meant to rule out the opponent's point of view. *Tat* (That) means *Brahman*, which is omniscient and omnipotent, which is the cause of the origin, existence, and dissolution of this universe, and which is known as such from the *Upaniṣads* alone. How? *Samanvayāt*, because of being the object of their fullest import; for in all the *Upaniṣads* the texts become fully reconciled when they are accepted as establishing this very fact in their fullest import. (As for instance): "O amiable one, this universe, before its creation, was but Existence, one without a second" (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.2.1); "Before creation this universe was but the Self that is one" (*Aitareya Upaniṣad* 1.1.1); "That *Brahman* is without prior or posterior, without interior or exterior (i.e. homogeneous and without a second). This Self, the perceiver of everything, is *Brahman*" (*Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 2.5.19); "All that is in front is *Brahman*, the immortal" (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 2.2.11); etc. Besides, when the words in the *Upaniṣadic* sentences become fully ascertained as but revealing the nature of *Brahman*, it is not proper to fancy some other meaning; for that will result in rejecting something established by the *Vedas* and accepting some other thing not intended by them. And it cannot be held that those words have for their ultimate purpose only a delineation of the nature of the agent (viz. the performer of the rites), for there are such Vedic texts as "(But when to the knower of *Brahman* everything has become the Self) then [...] what should one see and through

what?” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.14), which deny action, instrument, and result. Nor is *Brahman* an object of perception, even though It stands as an established, positive entity, for the unity of the Self and *Brahman*, as stated in “That thou art” (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.8.7), cannot be known otherwise than from the scriptural texts. As for the objection that instruction about *Brahman* is useless inasmuch as It is neither acceptable nor rejectable, that is nothing damaging; for the attainment of the highest human goal (of freedom) becomes an accomplished fact only when the total eradication of all sorrows comes about as a result of the realization of the Self as *Brahman* beyond acceptance and rejection.

The term *samanvaya*, again in the ablative singular case (*samanvayāt*), is also found in the foundational text of another system of Indian philosophy, i.e. Sāṃkhya. In the *Sāṃkhya-kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (c. 350-450), in *kārikās* 15-16 which present the inferences (*anumāna*) that establish the existence and makeup of the system’s ontological dualism, i.e. primordial materiality (*prakṛti*) and contentless consciousness (*puruṣa*), we read (Larson 1979: 260-261):

Because of the finiteness of specific things in the world which require a cause; because of homogeneity or sameness (*samanvayāt*) of the finite world; because of the power or potency (of the cause) which the process of emergence or evolution implies; because of separation or distinction between cause and its effect (with respect to modification or appearance); because of the undividedness or uniformity of the entire world; the unmanifest (*avyakta*) is the cause; it functions because of or by the interaction of the three *guṇas*²⁶, modified like water, due to the specific nature abiding in the respective *guṇas*.

One of the reasons why the unmanifest *avyakta*, i.e. materiality (*prakṛti*) in its unevolved/non emergent state, must be regarded as the ultimate cause (*kāraṇa*) is that all manifest things in this finite world, in so far as their characteristics are uniform and homogeneous (*samanvaya*), require a single cause as their source²⁷. Here *samanvaya* is applied to the supposed homogeneous/uniform characteristic of *prakṛti* as a whole. If this is so, the inference that can be drawn is that all creatures share the same basic qualities and this favors the interpretation that even among human beings there must be an in-built tendency toward concordance and harmony. In other words, notwithstanding the differences among humans and among the plurality of beings – which of course need to be recognized and accounted for – the conviction that ultimately we all share a common nature

²⁶ The three constituents of materiality, namely *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Initially, these three are experienced on a psychological level as pleasure, pain and delusion respectively. Finally, they come to stand for intelligibility, activity and restraint. For an overview on the three *guṇas*, see Malinar 2018.

²⁷ On these issues, see Larson & Bhattacharya 1987: 100, 155.

leads to the conclusion that the inclination toward accommodation, to appreciate what we have in common with one another, is only natural. The idea is that the astounding diversity that we perceive in the outer world through our senses diminishes as we go deeper within ourselves and ultimately disappears at the superconscious level: when this supreme awareness is achieved, all beings that appeared to be different and separate at the phenomenal level are recognized as one, i.e. merge into one undifferentiated substratum. Such persuasion is deeply engrained in Indian culture and Kuppuswami Sastri's own argumentations in *Compromises in the History of Advaitic Thought* testify to it.

It is important to note that it was in particular Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan²⁸, with whom Ranganathan was also in contact²⁹, that explicitly stressed that the notion of *samanvaya* or harmonization had to be extended to all the living faiths of mankind, in the conviction that such universalism was fully warranted by the Hindu tradition itself³⁰. Within the Hindu schools, however, the "agreement of all philosophical systems" (*sarva-darśana-samanvaya*) is a motif that appears only around the 16th century, in the works of authors such as Vijñānabhikṣu (c. 16th century), Appayya Dīkṣita (1520-1593) and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (c. 1540-1640). For instance, Vijñānabhikṣu in his *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya* points out that all orthodox systems and specifically Vedānta and Sāṃkhya, teach true knowledge and are ultimately without contradiction³¹. In the 19th and 20th centuries, spokesmen of Neo-Hinduism such as Vivekānanda and Radhakrishnan were successful in extrapolating and universalizing traditional schemes of *samanvaya* and linking them to the Western concept of tolerance, presenting India as the "mother of all religions" within a non-historical, timeless horizon of understanding³². Kuppuswami Sastri and Ranganathan both shared this mindset which reflected the spirit of the time.

When Kuppuswami Sastri (1946: 17) argues that "Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini themselves would appear to have exercised a wide reticence in respect of their

²⁸ On his figure, see Bartley 2018.

²⁹ Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan began his career in the Presidency College's Department of Philosophy in 1909, where he taught until 1918: he and Kuppuswami Sastri were thus colleagues. In 1945, as Vice-Chancellor of the Banaras Hindu University, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan contacted Ranganathan inviting him to develop the library system of the BHU. Ranganathan accepted the task and during 1945-1947 reorganized the entire collection single-handedly, classifying and cataloguing about 100,000 books; see Gopinath 1968: 62.

³⁰ On Radhakrishnan's Neo-Hinduism, see Halbfass 1990: 251-255. The Theosophical Society of Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831-1891) also emphasized the concordance (*samanvaya*) among all Hindu philosophical schools; see Rudbøg & Sand 2020.

³¹ See Larson & Bhattacharya 1987: 377-378.

³² On the utilization of the concept of *samanvaya* in Neo-Hinduism, see Halbfass 1990: 253, 261, 357-358, 365, 381, 408, 432.

own philosophical convictions. Perhaps they believed that philosophical thinking and the quest for truth would gain immensely by their *Sūtras* being so composed as to admit of use by several *bhāṣya-kāras* in support of Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita”, he aims at showing the inexhaustible potency of these foundational *sūtras*. In their succinctness, they allow for a rich variety of possible interpretations that are all justifiable/acceptable, thus implicitly acknowledging the plurality of interpretations as something positive. At the same time, the appreciation of the reservoir of multiple interpretations must never make us forget that they originate from one single source.

3. On Ranganathan’s Unitary Conception of Knowledge and the Power of Intuition

All this resonates with Kuppuswami Sastri’s idea that ordinary language is constitutively inadequate to define/describe what is. Therefore, the primary function of literature is to offer hints, to throw forth suggestions, stimulating the human mind to go beyond itself, beyond the realm of words and thought so as to develop supraconscious intuition. As Ranganathan recalls (1951: 174-175):

Mahamahopadhyaya Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri used to emphasize that a Sanskrit school of literary criticism was called the ‘School of Overtones.’ According to this School, literature leans more upon suppression than on expression. This means that the actual endeavor of a literary artist should be no more than to throw forth suggestions. Goethe claims that it can be no more than a suggestion. He states this on the basis of his own experience as a poet. He says that when a poet dives into his own depths, picks out his poetic experience, and recedes from the depths towards the level of consciousness, he finds that only a divine language can express this experience. But no such language is available. Even if it were, it cannot communicate anything to the common men. He is therefore obliged to use the language current in his community. He irradiates it so profoundly that its glow is extremely rich in color. Each member of the audience picks up only that color which the lens of his own experience permits to pass through. His lens may perhaps allow the slipping through of only a wee-bit of the other color in the immediate proximity to what is specific to himself. All the other colors will certainly be screened off. It is usually the filtering in of this extra color which stimulates him or gives him solace. He is blind to all the other colors. This implies that the primary process of natural language fails to be a fully transparent medium for communication. The difference between what is originated at the source and what is received at the other end is considerable. The medium of language is not totally expressive.

Ranganathan is keen to observe that a level of communication that is far more subtle than the literary one is that of mystical experience which is by definition unspeakable. He gives as an example the case of the modern Vedāntin

saint Rāmakṛṣṇa (1836-1886), who felt sad because of the impossibility to communicate to his disciples his beatific experience of *samādhi* (lit. “absorbed concentration”), i.e. of oneness with the Absolute *Brahman*³³. Being unmediated by the senses and the intellect, this direct experience of the “thing-in-itself” that Ranganathan translates as “trance-state”, is said to be achieved through intuition³⁴. Ranganathan points out that in the Sanskrit tradition this is known as divine insight, *divya-cakṣus*: “The climax in the *Bhagavad-gīta* is Krishna endowing Arjuna with that faculty to see globally all things-in-themselves³⁵. The *Ramayana* also refers to this all comprehensive unmediated intuition and experience and uses the word *tapas* [lit. “heat”, i.e. asceticism] to denote the means by which intuition is developed” (1951: 180). At this level of sublime communication, there is a patent inadequacy of natural language and even more so of classificatory language³⁶.

Ranganathan even alludes to the one who in Hinduism is believed to teach and communicate *Brahman* through eloquent silence, i.e. the god Śiva Dakṣiṇāmūrti, paradigm of the ever-young divine *guru* who is encircled by his old disciples and whose face (*mūrti*) is directed toward the south (*dakṣiṇa*) in order to counter and annihilate Death itself, Mṛtyu, who according to Hindu symbolology comes from the south. Thus, paraphrasing a hymn of praise in honor of Śiva Dakṣiṇāmūrti, the *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra* (vv. 11-12), Ranganathan writes (1951: 182): “What a wonder? Look into the shade of the banyan tree. There is a young Master sitting at the root. He is radiant. There is communication in silence. The disciples are all old. They are irradiated. Their doubts look dissolved”³⁷. Ranganathan concludes that such a sublime form of direct, unmediated communication/communion cannot lean upon any natural or classificatory language³⁸.

³³ On *samādhi*, see Rigopoulos 2019a: 32-61.

³⁴ On the roles that Ranganathan attributed to the intellect and to intuition, see Dousa 2019: 149-173. On intuition in Indian religions and philosophies, see Torella 2008b: 35-58 and Kavirāj 1923-24: 1-18, 113-132. On Gopīnāth Kavirāj’s own *pratibhā* or power of intuition, which led him to “full non-duality” (*pūrṇādvaita*), see Bianchi 2009: 18-22.

³⁵ See *Bhagavad-gītā* 11.8: “But thou canst not see Me with this same eye of thine own; I give thee a supernatural eye: behold My mystic power as God!” (Edgerton 1944: 55). Ranganathan also referred to the power of intuition as *divya indriya*, lit. “divine sense organ”, that he used to translate as “transcendental sense”.

³⁶ As he writes: “Though I have devoted a large part of this life-time of mine to the building up and improvement of classificatory language, I am second to none in declaring that literary exchange is a forbidden realm which classification should never enter. It must stop with individualizing authors and works and never presume to classify the thought-contents” (Ranganathan 1951: 178).

³⁷ For an English translation of the *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra*, see Nikhilānanda 1947: 196-202.

³⁸ On eloquent silence, see Rigopoulos 2017: 259-261.

Ranganathan writes that he was able to identify the foundational elements of his classification system, i.e. the Colon Classification (CC), together with the five laws of library science and the five fundamental categories of personality, matter, energy, space, and time (PMEST), precisely through his power of intuition (1961a: 88)³⁹. By the same token, he points out that what he came to identify as the canons of faceted notation⁴⁰ and seminal mnemonics⁴¹ were all intuition-based (1967: 309). Just like the ineffable experience of *samādhi*, seminal concepts are the products of intuition and are inexpressible through the human language: they can only be expressed through the use of notational digits, i.e. seminal mnemonics. His valorization of the foundational role of intuition vis-à-vis intellection is undoubtedly grounded in the Hindu philosophical and religious tradition.

Epistemologically, the principles of *eka-vākyatā* and *samanvaya*, i.e. of a unitary conception of knowledge and of a mutual reconciliation or consistency encompassing language, texts, ideas as well as all beings, played a crucial role in his recognition of intuition as a trans-cognitive means through which it is possible to “dive deep” within oneself and uncover a restricted set of elemental concepts, beneath the plurality of phenomena. Ranganathan constantly felt the need to intuitively move from plurality to unity or near-unity and such existential *élan* was further kindled by his mathematical mind that always led him to search for an encompassing unitary principle. Just as in the Mīmāṃsā exegesis of the *Vedas*, in Ranganathan’s universe of knowledge everything is linked to everything else, i.e. everything is thought to be harmoniously interrelated. His terse, *sūtra* style – as in the laws of library science –⁴² reflects a use of language which is typical of Indian philosophical schools, aiming toward a soteriological end. As Kul B. Gauri notes (1992: 116):

³⁹ See Kumar 1998: 201 (“Extract from the Letter of Dr. S. R. Ranganathan to Dr. M. S. Venkataramani”).

⁴⁰ This canon establishes the conditions under which it is appropriate to use a faceted notation.

⁴¹ This canon states that a scheme for classification should use one and the same digit to denote seminally equivalent concepts in whatever subject they may occur.

⁴² These are: 1. Books are for use; 2. Every person his book; 3. Every book its reader; 4. Save the time of the reader; 5. Library is a growing organism. Significantly, in *The Five Laws of Library Science* first published in 1931, Ranganathan appended the following quote taken from the *Manu-smṛiti*: “To carry knowledge to the doors of those that lack it and to educate all to perceive the right! Even to give away the whole earth cannot equal that form of service”. Moreover, he observed: “The Five Laws [of Library Science] are like Lord Narayana resting on his leafy float on the Ocean of Milk, ever watchful and ever alert, but abstaining from visible intervention except when the laws of the universe are overpowered by happenings not anticipated by them” (Ranganathan & Gopinath 1967: 115-116).

His search for an immutable structure of a facet syntax of a subject, or rather an “Absolute Syntax”, free from the linguistic, sociological and cultural factors does aim at discovering the ultimate in the language. This also amounts to the achievement of perfection of *dharma*, the ultimate order. One could also attribute a similar ritualistic import and quality to both his description and prescription of chain procedure in analyzing and constructing subject indexes which became articles of faith in the *British Technology Index* and *British National Bibliography*.

Like the Mīmāṃsā ritual tradition that makes the authority of the *Vedas* dependent on their timelessness, emptying them of their historical referentiality⁴³, Ranganathan’s unitary conception of knowledge was based on a scientific and even mystical paradigm, according to which truth is ultimately one and is independent of all historical contingencies⁴⁴. As he told to some of his students, this search for unity or oneness, this *reductio ad unum*, was a constant urge of his and the guiding principle of his life (Rahman 1965: 682):

Do you know? For me there is only one subject. Seminally, there is one and only one subject which manifests itself in the form of several subjects to the phenomenal world. I want to base my classification scheme [...] on this seminal rock bed. It shall have a schedule of not more than ten to twelve pages. And then, it shall be capable of classifying all the subjects that had been, that are, and that will be in existence in the dynamic continuum of the universe of knowledge [...]. The one I contemplate is a Seminal (once I called it Primordial!) Classification Scheme. I do not know whether I will accomplish it. Anyway, I am able to visualize it. It is true for me.

4. The Influence of Sāṃkhya on Ranganathan’s PMEST Categories

It is noteworthy that Ranganathan privileged the reducing of multiplicity into hierarchically ordered pentads, such as the five laws of library science and the five categories of personality, matter, energy, space and time⁴⁵. Though he never explained why the optimal set of categories should be five in number, a possible explanation can be found in the popular Indian idea that everything can ultimately be reduced to its five constitutive elements: the common expression *pañcatvaṃ gacchati*, i.e. to die (lit. “to revert to the five [elements of earth, water, air, fire

⁴³ On these issues, see Pollock 1989: 603-610.

⁴⁴ On his appreciation of mysticism, see Langridge 1974: 31-32. See also Dousa 2019: 166-171.

⁴⁵ On the hypothesis of an influence of the school of Vaiśeṣika and its six categories (*padārtha*) – substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), motion (*karman*), universals (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*) – on Ranganathan’s five categories, see Maz-zocchi & Gnoli 2010: 133-147. On the influence of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on Ranganathan’s classification theory, see Adhikary & Nandi 2003: 275-284; Adhikary 2002.

and space”]), illustrates this point⁴⁶. Moreover, various pentads are a characteristic of several schools of Indian philosophy. In particular, pentads are a hallmark of Sāṃkhya, the oldest among the six orthodox *darśanas*, whose twenty-five principles (*tattvas*) and fifty categories (*padārthas*) and core concepts such as the theory of the three *guṇas* have been most influential on all other systems⁴⁷. Thus in Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s *Sāṃkhya-kārikās* we find five arguments for the notion of the preexisting effect (*sat-kārya*; *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 9); five predications of the three constituent processes or *triḡuṇa* (*Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 11); five arguments for proving that unmanifest materiality (*avyakta*) is the cause (*kāraṇa*; *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 15); five arguments for the existence of *puruṣa*, i.e. contentless consciousness (*Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 17); five arguments for establishing the plurality of *puruṣas* (*puruṣa-bahutva*; *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 18); five basic predications of *puruṣa* (*Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 19).

In Sāṃkhya, pentads are typically concerned with the phenomenal world and the psychophysiology of biological life. Some of the most common ones are the following: sound (*śabda*), touch (*sparsā*), form (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), smell (*gandha*); space (*ākāśa*), wind (*vāyu*), fire (*tejas*), water (*ap*), earth (*prthivī*); hearing (*śrotra*), touching (*tvac*), seeing (*cakṣus*), tasting (*rasana*), smelling (*ghrāṇa*); speaking (*vāc*), grasping (*pāṇi*), walking (*pāda*), procreating (*upastha*), expelling (*pāyu*); life breath (*prāṇa*), up breath (*udāna*), diffuse breath (*vyāna*), digestive breath (*samāna*), down breath (*apāna*); steadfastness (*dhṛti*), faith (*śraddhā*), pleasure (*sukha*), desire to know (*vividiṣā*), desire not to know (*avividiṣā*).

It is tempting to hypothesize that Ranganathan was influenced by these Indic pentads, which were no doubt familiar to him, particularly when he intuitively

⁴⁶ For an appreciation of the frequency of number five (*pañca*) in Sanskrit compounds, see Monier-Williams 1988: 575-578. For instance, one is reminded of the compound *pañcāṅga* which is used, among other things, to refer to the five limbs of the body (head, neck, torso, arms and legs), the five parts of a tree (root, bark, leaf, flower and fruit), the five modes of devotion (silent prayer, oblations, libations, bathing idols and feeding Brahmins), any aggregate of five parts, and the popular almanacs of South India that contain information on five subjects, i.e. solar days, lunar days, asterisms, *yogas* and *karaṇas* (certain astrological divisions of the days of a month). On this latter meaning, see Yule & Burnell 1902: 665. For an overview of other pentads, see Piano 1996: 241-243. On the symbolism of number five, generally regarded as a most auspicious number, see Abbott 1932: 295-301.

⁴⁷ With reference to the seminal role of Sāṃkhya in the history of Indian thought, revealing is the following anecdote reported by Gerald James Larson: “Many years ago when I met the great Gopīnāth Kavirāj (1887-1976) for the first time in Varanasi, he inquired about my work. I commented that I was working on one of the ancient systems of Indian philosophy, namely, the Sāṃkhya. He impatiently waved his hand to interrupt me. ‘Sāṃkhya’, he said, ‘is not *one* of the systems of Indian philosophy. Sāṃkhya *is* the philosophy of India!’” (Larson & Bhattacharya 1987: xi).

developed his five categories of personality, matter, energy, space and time. With the first and foremost among them, personality, he aimed at identifying the focal subject, i.e. the “thing in itself” or the core/essence of whatever being/thing and field of investigation. Thus he argues that personality represents the fundamental subject of study of any particular discipline. For example, in medicine it is said to be represented by the bodily organs, in zoology by the animals, in botany by the vegetables, in librarianship by the various typologies of libraries, etc. Personality is nonetheless a subtle and elusive concept which escapes definition, as Ranganathan himself openly recognizes by saying that it is ineffable and thus suggesting the method of residues (1960: 81):

We have by now seen enough to say that Personality [P] is an ineffable or undefinable fundamental category. That is why we have to locate it by the method of residues – that is locate it as the residue which is left over after the removal of all the Time [T], Space [S], Energy [E] and Matter [M] from the fully expressed name of the subject. This really amounts to a negative way of picking out the [P]. Such a negative way is known to be the only way open to recognise or point out any ineffable entity. In the Vedic tradition, God is defined only in such a negative way. “Not this, not this” is the translation of the Sanskrit name given to this method of definition and recognition⁴⁸.

Here Ranganathan refers to the famous Upaniṣadic formula *neti neti* (= *na iti na iti*), “neither so, nor so”, which is used a number of times in the old *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (2.3.6, 4.2.4, 4.4.22, etc.) in order to indicate the ungraspable and inexpressible nature of the Absolute, i.e. Puruṣa or *ātman-Brahman*. The *neti neti* has the function of rejecting each and all possible ideas and definitions given that the Absolute can never be understood as an object, “it” being beyond language and thought⁴⁹. Appropriately, Ranganathan defines it as a method of definition and recognition: as Fausto Freschi noted back in 1989, in the schools of non-dual Vedānta the *neti neti* device is known as *apavāda*, i.e. sublation (lit. “denial”, “refutation”)⁵⁰, since the *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads* can provide no positive key to liberation due to the fact that the key lies in removing ignorance (*avidyā*) and thus all superimpositions (*adhyāropa*), which is a thoroughly negative endeavor⁵¹.

⁴⁸ As Ranganathan further points out: “After separating out the manifestations of Time, Space, Energy and Matter in a subject, the residue will often turn out to be Personality. For the residual facet must be a manifestation of one of the five fundamental categories, and by assumption the manifestations of all the other four fundamental categories have been separated out before reaching the residue. This may be called the Method of Residues” (1960: 68).

⁴⁹ On these issues, see Rigopoulos 2015: 101-117.

⁵⁰ See Freschi 1989: 102.

⁵¹ On these issues, see Satchidānandendra 1997. See also Loundo 2015: 65-96.

The category of personality points at the ontological essence attributed to any given being/thing, i.e. the pure Subject, what is known in Sāṃkhya as *puruṣa* – the male principle, symptomatically meaning “person”/“man” – and in the schools of Vedānta as *ātman*⁵². In Sāṃkhya, *puruṣa* is understood as pure consciousness, a transcendent yet immanent principle that enables materiality (*prakṛti*), which is utterly unconscious (*acetana*), to function in an orderly, teleological way. The idea is that *puruṣa* – the first of the twenty-five *tattvas* – is a contentless and passive witness (*sākṣitva*), totally detached (*mādhyasthya*, *udāsīna*) and isolated (*kevala*) from *prakṛti*. Yet, although *puruṣa* is conceptualized as being inactive (*akartṛ-bhāva*) and distinct from materiality, its sheer presence is believed to trigger the passage of materiality from its unmanifest state to its manifest state (*vyakta*), thus determining the unfolding (*pariṇāma*) of the other *tattvas* or principles, which all originate from *prakṛti*. In descending order, we find the intellect (*buddhi*) – the most subtle evolute of *prakṛti* – the ego (*ahaṃkāra*), the mind (*manas*), and the four pentads of the sense-capacities (*buddhīndriyas*), the five action-capacities (*karmendriyas*), the five subtle elements (*tan-mātras*) and the five gross elements (*mahā-bhūtas*)⁵³.

Ranganathan’s second category of matter refers to the manifest properties or characteristics of personality. If at an earlier stage he confined matter to the material constituent of any given thing, such as the wood of wooden chairs or the gold of golden coins, in time he came to widen the scope of matter by recognizing three variants of it, i.e. “matter material”, “matter property” and “matter method”. Ranganathan views the peculiar properties of things, persons, etc. such as their intensity, height, weight, volume, etc. as manifestations of “matter property”. Moreover, he argues that “matter method” manifests itself mostly in science and technology. For instance, in the class of geology specific branches of it such as mechanics and seismology would exemplify the “matter method”.

From the point of view of Indian philosophy, the category of matter finds a parallel with the Sāṃkhya principle of *prakṛti*, the second of the twenty-five *tattvas* which together with *puruṣa* constitutes the ontological dualism of the system⁵⁴. *Prakṛti* is nature or materiality in both its unmanifest and manifest condition, “from the creator god Brahmā down to a blade of grass” (*brahmā-di-stamba-paryanta*; *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 54). When manifest, it is thought to undergo constant modification (*pariṇāma*) being determined by its three constituents,

⁵² Along these lines, Ranganathan observes that each and every individual has *ātman* – his/her soul or immortal Self – *sūkṣma-śarīra* or “subtle body”, and *sthūla-śarīra* or “gross body”; see Ranganathan 1951: 253.

⁵³ On *puruṣa* in Sāṃkhya, see Larson & Bhattacharya 1987: 73-83. See also Malinar 2018 and Bäumer 1988: 23-40.

⁵⁴ On *prakṛti* in Sāṃkhya, see Jacobsen 2002. See also Larson & Bhattacharya 1987: 65-73.

i.e. the *guṇas* of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in mutual interaction. As noted, all other *tattvas* starting with the *buddhi* or intellect, which is the most refined product of materiality, and ending with the *mahā-bhūtas* or gross elements, are understood to be evolutes of *prakṛti*. In this regard, it is important to note that the *guṇa sattva* accounts for thought and intelligibility.

The realm of subjectivity, of the so-called “inner organ” (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) consisting of the triad of intellect, ego and mind – which carries on the functions of mental awareness based upon the data provided by the sense-capacities and action-capacities – is ultimately reduced to matter since the peculiar dualism and realism of Sāṃkhya does not envision any ontological distinction between “mind” and “matter”, “thought” and “extension” as is typical of Cartesian dualism. In particular, the intellect, which precedes ordinary self-awareness, has as its basic function what is known as ascertainment or determination (*adhyavasāya*), i.e. the discriminating capacity that establishes correct knowledge and enables one to act accordingly. Moreover, the intellect is regarded as the causal abode of the eight predispositions or fundamental strivings (*bhāvas*): virtue or meritorious behavior (*dharma*), vice or unmeritorious behavior (*adharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), ignorance (*ajñāna*), detachment (*virāga*), attachment (*rāga*), power or control (*aiśvarya*) and impotence or lack of power (*anaiśvarya*). In Sāṃkhya as well as Vedānta, the *buddhi* bears a crucial function since it is precisely through this most refined *tattva* that the intuition of supreme reality, i.e. of *puruṣa* or the *ātman*, is said to emerge. The purification of the *buddhi* that makes it shine in its pristine effulgence is thought to bring about the intuitive insight on the nature of reality, the recognition of what ultimately is, and thus lead to liberation. This function of the *buddhi* was most valued by Ranganathan who assigned a fundamental role to intuition, above and beyond the realm of intellection⁵⁵.

Ranganathan’s third category is energy and it refers to all possible actions, reactions, operations, processes, and techniques. Thus in library science the processes of cataloguing, indexing, computerization, preservation, management, etc. are all manifestations of this category. Energy operates through and among all kinds of entities, i.e. animate and inanimate, and it pertains to both the outer, physical realm and the inner, psychological realm of the mind and intellect. From an Indian viewpoint, this category is immediately reminiscent of *śakti*, the dynamic, vibrational aspect of divinity, i.e. its capacity to manifest the cosmos. Clearly Ranganathan had *śakti* in mind when he spoke about energy⁵⁶. In a pas-

⁵⁵ On the three constituents of the psyche, i.e. *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* and *manas* which all together are known as *citta* in classical Yoga, see Rigopoulos 2008: 47-71.

⁵⁶ On *śakti*, see Timalsina 2018.

sage of *Classification and Communication*, he explicitly equates the categories of personality, matter and energy with the concepts of *puruṣa*, *prakṛti* and *śakti*. We read (1951: 257-258):

The efficiency of a scheme of classification and its expectation of life will be determined largely by its capacity to isolate, handle and organise energy-facets in different subjects. For it is energy which enlivens matter. It is matter enlivened by energy which leaves its trail in space-time. It is only when energy-facets develop that personality gets differentiated and becomes comprehensible. Such is the potency of energy-facets. This is all in keeping with Vedic and other mystic traditions. Shri Aurobindo⁵⁷ has described it in several of his writings. The Trinity consists of *Puruṣa* (= the divine personality unmanifest), *Prakṛiti* (= the inert matter in need of enrichment by *Puruṣa*) and *Sakti* (= the energy-principle needed to effect the enrichment). The phenomenal world owes its existence to the functioning of the energy-principle⁵⁸.

Another comprehensive concept that Ranganathan might have had in mind with regard to the category of energy is that of *karman* or “action” in its three-fold varieties and dimensions, i.e. physical, vocal and mental⁵⁹. In Sāṃkhya, primordial materiality is thought to be inherently productive (*prasava-dharmin*; *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 11) since all material effects (*kārya*) are said to already exist in the primal material cause in a potential state prior to manifestation. Thus the process of causation does not generate anything new since the effect pre-exists in its cause (*sat-kārya*): all effects are thought to be the *vyakta*, i.e. manifest transformations of one basic existent, namely *prakṛti* or primordial materiality. Whereas in other philosophical systems such as Vaiśeṣika *śakti* or potentiality is relegated to the realm of nonbeing (*abhāva*), in both Sāṃkhya and Yoga the causal state is a potential one and actuality is of the nature of an effect or product. On the other hand, Vaiśeṣika recognizes *karman* or motion as one of its six fundamental categories: it may inher in atoms and their aggregates, such as composite physical bodies, but also in mental organs, and it is said to be of five types: moving upward, moving downward, bending, stretching, and simple loco-

⁵⁷ Born in Bengal but educated in England, Aurobindo Ghose (1872-1950) was an influential Vedāntic thinker whose system of “Integral Yoga” attracted a dedicated following, mainly among English-speakers, both in India and the West. The best known of his writings is *The Life Divine* (Aurobindo 2001).

⁵⁸ Ranganathan adds that the esoteric significance of *bīja akṣaras*, i.e. of “seed syllables” such as the *om* – powerful *mantras* that in Tantrism are revered as the sonic form of deities – could throw light on the problem of “the efficiency with which the energy-facets and the foci in them are isolated and arranged in a helpful order... I have been seeking it [= its esoteric significance]. But I have not yet met with success” (Ranganathan 1951: 258).

⁵⁹ On the concept of *karman*, see O’Flaherty 1980.

motion. The Vaiśeṣika category of *karman*, however, covers only a segment of what is more amply called act or process in other schools of Indian thought⁶⁰.

Ranganathan's fourth and fifth categories are space and time. These constitute an indissoluble pair since they are meant to contextualize all phenomena within their respective places and moments. In the early Vedic texts and in the *Upaniṣads*, the term that conveys the idea of world-space is *ākāśa*, the expanse in which everything and everyone lives and operates. Even in Yoga, *ākāśa* is the empty space in which all beings and things are and move (see *Yoga-sūtra* 3.41-42). According to Purāṇic cosmology, space (*diś*) or the physical universe is assumed to be contained within Brahmā's egg (*brahmāṇḍa*)⁶¹ and to be divided into twenty-one zones, comprised from top to bottom of six heavens plus the earth – conceived as a flat disc made up of seven concentric islands (*dvīpas*), separated from each other by a series of oceans – seven lower regions of Pātāla inhabited by mythical creatures such as *nāgas* and *asuras*, and seven hellish regions. At the center of the innermost island, i.e. Jambu-dvīpa or “the rose-apple island”, stands the conical, golden Mount Meru, the *axis mundi* extending into both heaven and hell. Jambu-dvīpa is said to be divided into nine regions the southernmost of which is Bhārata-varṣa, the Indian subcontinent, the only place where action and in particular ritual action is believed to bear results (*karma-bhūmi*).

Time (*kāla*) is also meticulously conceived in Hinduism, from a fraction of a second (*nimeṣa*) up to cosmic *kalpas* of the duration of 4,320,000,000 years, each *kalpa* (=1,000 *mahā-yugas*) corresponding to just a day in the life of the creator god Brahmā. A world age is one of a cycle of four: the *kṛta-yuga* or *satya-yuga*, i.e. “the golden age”, the *tretā-yuga*, the *dvāpara-yuga* and the final *kali-yuga* said to be the most perverted age of the duration of 432,000 years⁶². Each complete cycle of four *yugas* is known as a *mahā-yuga* and culminates in a cosmic dissolution at the end of a *kali-yuga*, which is then followed by a new manifestation of the cosmos which starts the cycle again with another *kṛta-yuga*. Hindus believe that we presently live in a *kali-yuga* which began with the death of Kṛṣṇa, an incarnation (*avatāra*) of god Viṣṇu, traditionally dated February 18, 3103/3102

⁶⁰ On *karman* in Vaiśeṣika, see Halbfass 1992: 71-73, 92, 220.

⁶¹ The creator god Brahmā is said to be born from the eternal, unmanifest first cause inside a golden egg. According to *Manu-smṛti* 1.12, after a year Brahmā split the egg in two by brooding on his own body and thus manifested the physical and psycho-physical worlds and all beings. Nonetheless, the egg is thought to remain unhatched and thus the universe is conceived as a closed egg-shaped entity.

⁶² *Kali* is the die (*akṣa*) or side of a die marked with one dot, the losing die; see D'Intino 2005: 125-149. The term is used metaphorically to designate the most degenerate of the four *yugas*. It is characterized by a shorter lifespan and a moral and spiritual decadence, i.e. the prevalence of *adharma* over *dharma*.

BCE: thus we are just at the beginning of our dark age. All in all, space and time are conceived as cyclical and as part and parcel of *saṃsāra*, the painful wheel of births (*punar-janman*) and deaths (*punar-mṛtyu*) from which man must strive to exit by achieving *mokṣa*⁶³.

Within Sāṃkhya, space and time are conceptualized as derived correlates of a beginningless process of combination (*samghāta*) and change (*pariṇāma*) and thus they are not thought of as *tattvas* in and of themselves but rather as phenomenal appearances. The underlying idea is that both *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are beginningless and all-pervasive and that space and time are but derivative phenomena of the twenty-three *tattvas* evolved from *prakṛti*, which *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 10 describes as generated, temporal, spatial, active, plural, supported, mergent, composite and dependent. As *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 33 states: “The external organ (*bāhya-karaṇa*, i.e. the five sense-capacities and the five action-capacities) [functions] in present time. The internal organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*, i.e. intellect, egoity and mind) [functions] in the three times (i.e. past, present, and future)” (Larson 1979: 266). On the other hand, in Vaiśeṣika space and time are taken as two of the nine ultimate substances (*dravya*), the basic world constituents. They are thought of as eternal, all-pervasive, unitary substances. Indeed, according to Vaiśeṣika “time is an entity and not the horizon in which entities exist nor the abyss in which they disappear. There is not much room for reflections concerning ‘being and time’, or ‘being-in-time’, nor for speculations on past, present and future as modes of existence or on potentiality and actuality” (Halbfass 1992: 55)⁶⁴. In Advaita Vedānta, the domain of temporality along with that of spatiality is incompatible with reality in the true sense, i.e. with *ātman-Brahman*, and it is thus relegated to the status of cosmic illusion (*māyā*). The phenomenal world (*jagat*) perceived by the senses is regarded as being ultimately false (*mithyā*). Significantly, in *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* 2.3.7 Śaṅkara says that the *ātman* has the “nature of eternal presence” (*vartamāna-svabhāva*).

5. The Science of Cataloguing: Ranganathan’s and Kuppaswami’s Convergent Interests

Having appreciated how Ranganathan’s “discovery” of the five fundamental categories and more broadly his entire intellectual enterprise was inspired by Indian philosophical concepts and particularly by the exegetical principles of *eka-vākyatā* and *samanvaya* that were communicated to him by Kuppaswami

⁶³ On the Hindu concepts of space and time, see Rigopoulos 2010: 133-145. See also Piantelli 1995: 331-355.

⁶⁴ On the Vaiśeṣika concept of time, see Halbfass 1992: 205-228.

Sastri, one final word should be said about Ranganathan's and Kuppuswami Sastri's convergent interests and reciprocal influence with regard to the preservation and classification of manuscripts and the science of cataloguing. The social, educational value of classified arrangement, open access, and reference service was a topic that Ranganathan frequently discussed with some deep thinkers "with penetration, appreciation, and satisfaction", among whom was Kuppuswami Sastri (1961b: 37).

Ranganathan's *The Five Laws of Library Science*, which he dedicated to Edward Burns Ross, dates to 1931 and the first edition of his *Colon Classification* was published in 1933. Ranganathan notes that "our revered friend, the late Mahamahopadhyaya Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, clothed these five laws [of library science] in Sanskrit verse. Here is its latest version (Ranganathan & Sivaraman 1951: 16-17): *granthālayī sadāsevī pañcasūtrī parāyaṇaḥ | granthā adhyetum ete ca sarvebhyaḥ svam svam āpnuyuḥ || adhyetuḥ samayaṃ śeṣeḍ ālayo nityam eva ca | vardhiṣṇur eva cinmūrṭiḥ pañcasūtrī sadā jayet ||*"⁶⁵. Moreover, the third part of Ranganathan's *Colon Classification* titled "Schedules of Classics and Sacred Books with Special Names", which is relative to Indian culture, was prepared with the aid of Kuppuswami Sastri as he himself acknowledges (1933: 3-2 to 3-126).

Kuppuswami Sastri's *New Catalogus Catalogorum* also originated in the early 1930s, i.e. in the years 1933-35, as a supplement to Dr. Theodor Aufrecht's (1822-1907) monumental *Catalogus Catalogorum* of 1903⁶⁶. In 1940, with reference to such gigantic enterprise of a "retrospective linguistic bibliography", Ranganathan observed that "it has been a matter of great pride and deep interest that an earnest attempt is now being made by an Indian agency and that too in a field which is eminently its own and which no foreign agency can cultivate with equal insight, facility and precision" (Ranganathan & Sundaram 1940: 430)⁶⁷.

While Kuppuswami Sastri mostly followed the methodology adopted by Dr. Aufrecht, it is significant that in line with the guiding principle of *eka-vākyatā* he specified that "the chief purpose of a *Catalogus Catalogorum* is to consolidate in one book of reference all the references available in a whole library of catalogues. Since a *Catalogus Catalogorum* is mainly an index to the catalogues

⁶⁵ Kuppuswami Sastri's verse (*śloka*) – here slightly emended – is not a literal translation but his own rendering of the five laws of library science. It is also found in Ranganathan 1957.

⁶⁶ On Kuppuswami Sastri's enterprise, see Kirfel & Kuppuswami Sastri 1935: 429-431. With the death of Kuppuswami Sastri it was Dr. Venkataraman Raghavan (1908-1979) – part of the original editorial board – who prepared the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*; see Sternbach 1972: 178-179.

⁶⁷ Significantly, the book is dedicated to "Mahamahopadhyaya Vidyavacaspati S. Kuppuswami Sastri".

themselves, too many details about the manuscripts have not been added under the names. Only important or original information is added” (Kuppaswami Sastri 1937: vi). Ranganathan praises Kuppaswami Sastri for the way he deals with the problem of authorial homonymy and polyonymy in Sanskrit literature – the latter’s golden rule of the refusal to be guided by mere names (Ranganathan & Sundaram 1940: 426-427)⁶⁸ – and more generally for his Indian scheme of classification, which, besides being a “universal scheme, it has developed devices by which it satisfies the Canon of Local Variation and the Canon of Classics to a remarkable degree. These devices make it easily adaptable to any special situation. It is particularly so to the situation created by the Sanskrit classics. It is the Colon Classification sponsored by the Madras Library Association” (Ranganathan & Sundaram 1940: 429).

Moreover (Ranganathan & Sundaram 1940: 429):

While working out the details of its application to the Sanskrit classics, its author [=Ranganathan] had the unique opportunity of communing almost every day for several hours and for many months with the living encyclopaedia and bibliography of Sanskrit classics whom the University of Madras had the proud privilege of counting as one of its distinguished alumni. With the unstinted and eager help of Mahamahopadhyaya S. Kuppaswami Sastri, ready-made class numbers have been fitted to most of the Sanskrit classics and are given in the illustrative schedules of the *Colon classification*. Such schedules of ready-made class numbers are provided for the classics in Agriculture, Medicine, Spiritual Experience and Mysticism, Fine Arts, Literature, Linguistics, Hinduism (Vedic and post-Vedic), Jainism, Buddhism, the six major and the other minor systems of Indian Philosophy and Law. It is the Mahamahopadhyaya’s belief and our experience in the Madras University Library that this scheme can individualize any Sanskrit classic without the least violence to its filial relation to other classics.

Another important influence of Indian philosophy on Ranganathan’s approach to library science and cataloguing were the so-called laws of interpretation, originally developed within the schools of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya⁶⁹. Following their application, he underlines the importance of arriving at an accommodation by adopting compromise as a solution to interpretative conflicts. He writes (1958: 50-51):

Laws of interpretation. The well-known principles of interpretation, such as the 1,008 principles of interpretation listed in the *Nyaya-kosa*⁷⁰. These principles have been

⁶⁸ On this issue, see Kuppaswami Sastri 1960: 41-43.

⁶⁹ A text that Ranganathan had certainly in mind is that of Sarkar 1909.

⁷⁰ On the 1,008 principles of interpretation, see Ranganathan 1944. With regard to these 1,008 principles, M.A. Gopinath writes: “The postulate of fundamental categories – Person-

evolved to a remarkable extent by the philosophers of the Purva-Mimamsa and the Nyaya Schools of Indian philosophy. In law too, such principles are applied necessarily. A Catalogue Code is like a legal document. Any Rule in it should be interpreted like a legal text. For example, there may be a conflict between one Rule and another. In actual application, the conflict should be resolved with the aid of the Laws of Interpretation... One of the Laws of Interpretation is called “Lost-horse, Burnt-chariot” principle... There is often conflict between the Law of Parsimony, the Laws of Library Science, and the Canons of Cataloguing. The conflict has to be removed quite often with the aid of the Laws of Interpretation... The Fifth Law [of Library Science] – Library is a Growing Organism – often sides the Law of Parsimony and gets into conflict with the other Laws of Library Science. If possible, a compromise has to be arrived at in every such case of conflict. If a compromise is not at all possible the principle of “the later the law, the greater its weightage” is applied. It has been an unfulfilled ambition to scrutinize the entire Classified Catalogue Code from the angle of the Laws of Interpretation. My friend Mahamahopadhyaya Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri was an eminent specialist in the subject. He and myself had intended to take up such a scrutiny of the Classified Catalogue Code, after both of us would retire from the salary-earning stage of life. But, alas, he died before I could retire. I then sought to do the work in collaboration with a student of his. But it did not mature. The application of the Laws of Interpretation to the Classified Catalogue Code will be an eminent subject for investigation by an aspirant to a Doctorate in Library Science.

One of the basic Mīmāṃsā principles of interpretation is the so-called *sāmañ-jasya* (lit. “fitness”, “propriety”, “justice”) axiom, according to which all attempts should be made at the reconciliation of apparently conflicting texts. As Kishori Lal Sarkar states: “Contradiction between words and sentences is not to be presumed where it is possible to reconcile them”⁷¹. Ranganathan recalls one of its illustrations through the popular maxim of the lost horses and the burnt chariot (*naṣṭāśva-dagdha-ratha-nyāya*), which is based on the story of two men travelling in their respective chariots and one of them losing his horses and the other having his chariot burnt due to the outbreak of a fire in the village in which

ality, Matter, Energy, Space and Time – was done by Ranganathan in 1944. The Colon Classification had already been designed. Two editions (1933;1939) had been published. The postulate was developed and a statement of it was made after an empirical analysis of about 1,008 sample examples. The analysis led to a generalisation and fundamentalisation. The next edition of the Colon Classification (Ed. 3, 1950) was published without incorporating the postulate of fundamental categories. The fourth, fifth and sixth editions (1952;1957;1960) incorporated the fundamental categories. But the recognition aids for fundamental categories – were not delineated” (1968: 158).

⁷¹ Sarkar 1909: 69. Jimūtavāhana (c. 12th century) is said to have applied this principle for reconciling the conflicting views in the law-books (*dharmā-śāstras*) of Manu and Yājñavalkya on the right of succession. On these issues, see Rocher 2013: 497-502.

they were putting up for the night. In the interest of both, the horses that were left were harnessed to the remaining chariot and the two men pursued their journey together. This tale is meant to teach union for mutual advantage⁷².

As these few notes evidence, I am persuaded that an in-depth study of the theory and practice of the science of cataloguing of both Ranganathan and Kuppaswami Sastri would be extremely rewarding, proving the extent to which these two outstanding figures were in an ongoing dialogue with one another. Each of them was eager to share his profound knowledge and sophisticated methodological perspectives with the other, and in such mutual interplay the influence on Ranganathan of Indian philosophical concepts was no doubt paramount.

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⁷² See Gupta 1968: 199-216. See also Katju (1993) and *Mimamsa* 2018.

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